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Internationally-Shared Water Resources:
Restricted Sovereignty vs. Community of Property
Joseph W. Dellapenna*
I. INTRODUCTION
D uring Operation Desert Storm, the coalition air forces targeted
electric power stations, impairing water supplies for civilian and
military needs. The impairment of water supplies resulted both from the
incidental destruction of water storage facilities and, more importantly,
from the deprivation of power from the pumping stations as a result of
the coalition's bombing of Iraqi electric grids.' Interestingly, this effect
of the war, barely noted in the popular press, has almost completely es-
caped the attention of scholars writing about environmental injury as a
military tactic during the fortunately brief war, perhaps because the
Professor of Law, Villanova University; LL.M., Columbia University (1974); LL.M. in
International and Comparative Law, George Washington University (1969); J.D., Detroit College
of Law (1968); B.B.A. University of Michigan (1965).
For nine years I have consulted on the Middle East Water Project, under the Direction of
Dr. Thomas Naff, first at the Middle East Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania
and later with the Associates for Middle East Research, Inc. The project has already produced a
single volume study, WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST. CONFLIcT OR COOPERATION? (Thomas Naff & Ruth
Matson eds. 1984). The project is now preparing a series of volumes on specific aspects of the
water in the Middle East to be entitled WATER: THE MIDDLE EAST IMPERATIVE, publication having
begun in 1990. I will contribute a volume to this series to be entitled MIDDLE EAST WATER: THE
POTEmTIAL AND LmIrrS OF LAW, to be published in 1994. I have also consulted with the Portuguese
Directory-General of Natural Resources (Direcqao-Geral dos Recursos Naturais) as a Fulbright
grantee in the summer of 1990.
' See, e.g., Norma Greenaway, Casualties Mount in Aftennath of "Bomb Now, Die Later
War": Thousands More Will Die in Gulf as Long as Sanctions Stay in Place, Physicians' Group
Warns, THE GAzETrE (Montreal), July 25, 1991, at D8; Lee Hockstader, Baghdad Residents Face
Health Crisis; Fouled Water Supply Could Cause Disease, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 1991, at AI5;
Caryle Murphy, Sewage Problems Surface in Baghdad: Iraqis Find Themselves Ankle-Deep in an
Unpleasant Postwar Mess, WASH. POST, July 6, 1991, at Al.
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Iraqis considerably exaggerated the damage to their water supply.2
Similarly, both the popular press and scholarly commentary have
seldom accorded much attention to the role of the long-brewing con-
troversy over the waters of the Jordan Valley in the inability of states
that share the basin to make peace with each other.3 The parties in the
region certainly recognize its importance even though they themselves
have tended not to speak openly of their desires and fears.4 Nonethe-
less, in November, 1992, Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan announced a
written agreement on a peace treaty framework designed to lead to a
comprehensive settlement of all Arab-Israeli issues.5 This agreement
confirmed the two nations' understanding that the sharing of water, as
much as the establishment of mutually agreeable land borders and the
assurance of military security for the states of the region, is central to
any peace treaty. After all, the impending water shortages in the Jordan
River valley will place increasing pressure on all states in the basin and
will be severe enough to strain negotiations concerning the sharing of
waters in that small region.6
2 John G. Heidenreich, The Gulf War: How Many Iraqis Died?, 90 FOREIGN POL'Y 108,
117-19 (1993). For examples of scholars who have written about "environmental warfare" without
mentioning the interruption of Iraqi water supplies, see Robert Kogod Goldman, The Legal Re-
gime Governing the Conduct of Operation Desert Storm, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 363 (1992); Marc
Ross, Note, Environmental Warfare and the Persian Gulf War: Possible Remedies to Combat
Intentional Destruction of the Environment, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 515, 520-25 (1992); Oscar
Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 452 (1991). For one of
the few articles to discuss attacks on dams, see Burrus M. Carnahan, Note, Protecting Nuclear
Facilities from Military Attack: Prospects after the Gulf War, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 524 (1992).
' It is interesting to note that Israel has actually signed a peace agreement only with
Egypt-its sole neighbor with neither a claim to any part of the Jordan Valley nor a significant
interest in the waters of the Jordan. For an examination of the role of water in the Jordan
Valley conflict, see WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST: CONFLICT OF COOPERATION? 17-62, 158-98
(Thomas Naff & Ruth Marson eds., 1984) [hereinafter WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST]; SAMIR N.
SALIBA, THE JORDAN RIVER DISPUTE (1968); Joseph Dellapenna, Water in the Jordan Valley:
The Potential and Limits of Law, 5 PAL. Y.B. INT'L L. 15 (1989).
' Carol Morello, Water Scarcity Reaches Crisis Level in Mideast, THE TIMES-PISCAYNE, Oct.
24, 1993, at A32 (stating that the water crisis in the Middle East can no longer be "blithely ig-
nored").
' Clyde Haberman, Israel and Jordan Agree They Want Formal Treaty, N.Y. TImES, Nov.
2, 1992, at A3.
6 Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan both regularly consume water in excess of the annual
recharge of the area's water sources. This problem will become more critical when Israeli re-
strictions on Palestinian water usage in the Occupied Territories (the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip) are removed. Despite the fact that even a modest drought increases pressures on all three
political units, the populations within all three continue to grow exponentially-due at least in
part to a deliberate political-military strategy. See WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 3, at
17-22; SALIBA, supra note 3, at 32-45; Dellapenna, supra note 3, at 19-22; George Joff6, The
Issue of Water in the Middle East and North Africa, in RESOURCE POLITICS: FRESHWATER AND
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The September 13, 1993, accord between Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization has reflected the significance of water issues in
the region. The Israeli-Palestinian accord, which did little more than
provide a vague framework for further talks, was accompanied by four
annexes listing matters for further negotiations.' Annex I (following
annexes on the conduct of elections in the Occupied Territories and on
the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho) ad-
dressed issues of cooperation in economic and development programs
and lists "cooperation in the field of water" as the one subject to be
negotiated. A subsequently announced agenda for pursuing parallel talks
between Israel and Jordan gave similar prominence to water, listing it
after the need for peace and steps to assure mutual security and before
such topics as borders and refugees.'
Water's unique status as a resource has made it a frequent object of
international controversy and conflict even between friendly neighboring
states.9 States joined in a federal union have engaged in long and bitter
political and legal struggles over the waters they share." Similar prob-
REGIONAL RELATIONS 65, 70-71 (Caroline Thomas & Darryl Howlett eds., 1993).
' The Text: "Put an End to Decades of Confrontation and Conflict," N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1,
1993, at A8.
' Israel and Jordan Plan Talks: Text of the Informal Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1993,
at A12.
I For example, the United States and Canada, notwithstanding the highly successful op-
erations of the International Joint Commission on Boundary Waters, have struggled with appar-
ently endless disputes over the Great Lakes and other shared waters. See generally JOHN
KRUTILLA, THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY: THE ECONOMICS OF AN INTERNATIONAL RIVER BASIN
DEVELOPMENT (1967); DON C. PIPER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE GREAT LAKES (1967);
Ralph Johnson, The Columbia Basin, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 167
(Albert Garretson et al. eds., 1967); Symposium, U.S.-Canada Transboundary Resource Issues, 26
NAT. RESOURCES J. 201 (1986) [hereinafter Symposium]; Albert E. Utton, Canadian International
Waters, in 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 45 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991).
0 These struggles within the United States have involved the interests of states, the federal
government, American Indian tribes, other public and private entities, and foreign nations. See
Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124 (1987) affg special master recommendation, 485 U.S. 388
(1988); Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 388 U.S. 426
(1967); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), decree entered, 376 U.S. 340 (1964), decree
amended, 383 U.S. 268 (1966), supplemental decree, 439 U.S. 419 (1979), exceptions sustained
in part and overruled in part, 460 U.S. 605 (1982), reh'g denied, 462 U.S. 1146 (1983), and
order amended, 466 U.S. 144 (1984); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 805 (1931), modified,
347 U.S. 995 (1954); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Colorado v. Kansas, 320
U.S. 383 (1943), reh'g denied, 321 U.S. 803 (1944); Wyoming v. Colorado, 309 U.S. 572
(1940) reh'g denied, 310 U.S. 656 (1940); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936); Nebras-
ka v. Vyoming, 295 U.S. 40 (1935); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931); Connecti-
cut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 179 (1930); Arizona
v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) modified 353
U.S. 953 (1957); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496
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lems concerning transboundary aquifers have begun to emerge in recent
years."
Yet matters are not as bad as this picture suggests. Regardless of
how violent conflicts might become between states sharing a common
watersource, especially where water itself has played a central role in
the dispute, water and water use facilities have usually been immune to
military attack in the twentieth century.12 States that are otherwise
seemingly locked into apparently uncompromising and never ending
enmity have nonetheless negotiated cooperative water arrangements and
continued to comply with pre-existing arrangements. For example, India
and Pakistan have engaged in three full-scale, albeit limited, wars since
1947, as well as numerous other skirmishes and serious threats of
war. 3 Yet, in each instance, they did not target water facilities or inter-
(1906). See generally Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Water Allocation, in 4 WATERS AND WATER
435, 435-650 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991); A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of Equitable Apportionment
Revisited, Updated, and Restated, 56 COLO. L. REV. 381 (1985).
" See generally Julio Barberis, The Development of the International Law of Transboundary
Groundwater, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 167 (1991); Robert D. Hayton & Albert E. Utton,
Transboundary Groundwaters: The Bellagio Draft Treaty, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 663 (1989);
Ann Berkley Rodgers & Albert E. Utton, The Ixtapa Draft Agreement Relating to the Use of
Transboundary Groundwaters, in TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES LAW 151 (Albert E. Utton &
Ludwik A. Teclaff eds., 1987).
12 The protection of dams is now codified in Protocol I of the Geneva Convention's Laws
of War. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, art. 56, 16
I.L.M. 1391, 1415 (protecting "[w]orks or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams,
dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations..."). The importance of this protection is
indicated by the inclusion of dam and dike protection in the same section that prohibits attacks
on nuclear facilities. Id. In another words, attacks are prohibited where they would cause severe
losses to civilian populations. Additionally, attacks on dams and dikes are prohibited unless the
dam is used "other than for its normal function and in regular, significant and direct support of
military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support.' l
Although the United States has signed the protocol, it has declined to ratify it, apparently fearing
that it would appear "soft" on terrorism. See Goldman, supra note 2, at 385; THOMAS MERON,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAw 62-70, 74-78 (1989). See
generally George H. Aldrich, Progressive Development of the Laws of War: A Reply to Criti-
cisms of the 1977 Geneva Protocol I, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 693 (1986); George H. Aldrich,
Prospects for United States Ratification of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1991); Carahan, supra note 2; Ross, supra note 2.
The Draft Articles prepared by the International Law Commission on the Law of Non-Navi-
gational Use of International Watercourses also attempt to codify the practice of placing water
sources and facilities off-limits to combat. Draft Articles on the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, Draft Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 43d
Sess., art. 29, at U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/L.463/Add.4, (1991), reprinted in 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENVT'L
L. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Draft Articles].
, Hindu-Muslim hostility in the region dates back more than one-thousand years, but was
suppressed under British rule in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The partition of
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fere in the operations of a joint Indo-Pakistani water management ad-
ministration.14 Even in the Jordan Valley, where despite more than 60
years of virtually continuous low-level conflict and occasional full-scale
wars between Israel (or the Jewish settlers before the establishment of
Israel) and its neighbors, tacit cooperation over water actually has re-
mained intact-particularly between Israel and Jordan. 5
Water is simply too critical a resource to fight over. Even in in-
tense conflicts, each side realizes that depriving the enemy of the water
necessary for survival is one of the few steps that could make even a
significantly weaker state desperate enough to fight against any odds and
to target its enemies' water facilities, facilities that would be impossible
to defend against a sufficiently determined foe. The destruction of Iraqi
water delivery capacity and the famous raids on German dams during
World War II,16 the two primary examples of attacks on water facilities
in the twentieth century, 7 both occurred after, and indeed because, the
"British India" into a predominantly Hindu state (India) and a predominantly Muslim state (Paki-
stan) did not fully separate the two populations (not to mention numerous smaller ethno-religious
groups) and resulted in conflicting claims over land, people, and water. The result has been
ongoing hostility, including full-scale wars in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971. See generally Amaury de
Riencourt, India and Pakistan in the Shadow of Afghanistan, 61 FOREIGN AFF. 416 (1982).
", See generally Brian E. Concannon, Note, The Indus Waters Treaty: Three Decades of
Success, Yet, Will It Endure?, 1 GEo. INT'L ENVT'L L. REv. 55 (1989). See also LUDWiK A.
TEcLAFF, THE RIVER BASIN IN HISTORY AND LAW 163-65, 183-84 (1967) [hereinafter HISTORY
AND LAW]; R.R. Baxter, The Indus Basin, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS
443 (A.H. Garretson et al. eds., 1967). For a summary of the treaty relationship, see infra notes
88-91 and accompanying text.
The reluctance of the two states to interfere with water use is all the more remarkable
considering that both states have sought to acquire nuclear weapons-apparently to threaten to
use against each other. See Onkar Marwah, India and Pakistan: Nuclear Rivals in South Asia, 35
INT'L ORG. 165 (1981); Gary Milhollin, Stopping the Indian Bomb, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 593
(1987).
'5 See generally ADAM GARFINKLE, ISRAEL AND JORDAN IN THE SHADOW OF WAR 34-40,
79-83, 116, 162-73 (1992); ISRAEL AND ARAB WATERS: AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM (Abdul
Majid Fared & Hussein Sarriyeh eds., 1985); Dellapenna, supra note 3.
This observation remains valid regardless of whether one accepts or rejects the claim that
Israel's geopolitical strategy has followed an "hydraulic imperative." See, e.g., John Cooley,
Behind the News: the Hydraulic Imperative, 205 MIDDLE EAST INT'L, July 22, 1983, at 10;
Thomas Stauffer, The Lure of the Litani, MIDDLE EAST INT'L, July 30, 1982, at 13.
16 See PAUL BRIcKHnL, THE DAM BUSTERS (1951) (and the memorable motion picture of
the same name was based on the book).
I" Iraq's diversion of rivers during its war with Iran in the 1980's did not deprive civilians
of their water, rather, it served to create "water barriers," where water was plentiful, in an
attempt to stop the advancing Iranian military. Ross, supra note 2, at 518. Iraq's reliance on
such measures was as much an indication of its desperation during the late stages of the war as
it was a reflection of Saddam Hussein's egomania. See generally Margaret T. Okordudu-Fubara,
Oil in the Persian War: Legal Appraisal of an Environmental Warfare, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 123
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attacking side perceived that it was not reciprocally vulnerable to similar
attacks on its facilities." The Serbian sabotaging and later shelling of
the Peruca dam early in 1993 is a special case, testifying more to the
irrational intensity of the fighting flowing from the collapse of Yugosla-
via than a lack of reciprocal risks to the Serbs. 9 Still, the Serbs and
others have refrained from bombing other dams. However, the Serbs
have not hesitated to cut off or attack urban and rural water supply
systems in their genocidal campaign against the Bosnian Moslems."
This is yet another instance of water becoming a target (or a weapon)
when there is no reciprocal risk to those doing the attacking.
Thus, despite the difficulties to be encountered in addressing the
water problems in the basin of the Jordan River and elsewhere in the
Middle East, there remains reason for optimism." International law will
need to play a role in fostering cooperation over shared waters and to
prevent future conflicts. International law, in many respects, is still a
primitive legal system,2 and its practitioners have often been able to
devise doctrinal schemes of considerable sophistication, which too often
have not been translated into effective institutional arrangementsY The
task has fallen to diplomats and politicians with predictably mixed re-
(1991).
" There were also aerial attacks on North Korean dams during the Korean War, again with-
out risk of reciprocal attacks on the attacker's water facilities. ROBERT F. FUTRELL, THE UNITED
STATES AIR FORCE IN KOREA 1950-1953 627-28, 637 (1961). Surprisingly, the American's ap-
parently indiscriminate bombing during the Vietnam War did not include attacks on dams and
dikes despite the obvious vulnerability of North Vietnam's irrigated agricultural system in the
Red River delta. See Goldman, supra note 2, at 389. This can hardly be attributed to the fear of
reciprocal attacks as such attacks were no more likely to occur on American dikes and dams
than they were on American roads, railroads, or hospitals.
19 See Warren Gerard, Ecological Disaster Looms in Croatia, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 31, 1993,
at B4; Jonathan C. Randal, Croats Struggle to Stop Dam Collapse: Thousands Are Imperiled,
Serbs Are Accused of Detonating Charges, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1993, at Al; Carol Williams,
Croats Rush to Drain Massive Lake Behind Dam, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1993, at A4.
' See, e.g., John Pomfret, In Sarajevo, Doctors are Powerless; Electrical Shutoff Cripples
Hospital; Part of City Gets Water Again, WASH. POST, July 15, 1993, at A24.
V See GARFINKLE, supra note 15, at 34-40, 79-83, 116, 162-73; Dellapenna, supra note 3.
" See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 77-96 (1961); WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST,
supra note 3, at 157-60; MARK JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 52-54 (2d ed.
1993); Yoram Dinstein, International Law as a Primitive Legal System, 19 INT'L L. & POLITICS
1 (1986).
' The United Nations is itself an excellent example. A more purely doctrinal example would
be the general recognition of the high seas (including the deep ocean floor) as the "common
heritage of mankind." See, e.g., ROBERT FRIEDHEIM, NEGOTIATING THE NEW OCEAN REGIIE
(1993). This could be coupled with the heretofore complete failure to create an effective manage-
ment scheme for this region, leading to the appropriation of vast areas of high seas for the
exclusive use of the adjoining coastal state. Id.
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suits. Customary international law has largely failed to fulfill this need.
Thus, there needs to be institution builders who, to be effective, must
combine the sophisticated insights of international lawyers with the
practical structures created by political actors in an effort to adopt
treaties. The goal of these treaties should be to create institutions appro-
priate for the management of cooperative activities and the resolution of
conflicts before they escalate to injurious levels.
The focus of this article is on the role bilateral or multilateral inter-
national agreements have played, and could play, in international water
management.24 In Section II of this article, I summarize the achieve-
ments and failures of customary international law relating to internation-
ally-shared waters. In Section I, I describe the patterns of treaties
adopted over the years to coordinate the management of internationally-
shared water resources. In Section IV, I describe the agreements relating
to the Nile River, the primary example of treaty management of Middle
Eastern waters. In the final section, I propose an ideal pattern for water
management arrangements which is derived from the numerous treaties
relating to shared water bodies. This proposed institutional framework is
essential to any region facing the threat of increasingly desperate water
shortages.
II. SHARING INTERNATIONAL WATER RESOURCES: THE FAILURE OF
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES
Apart from international agreements, international law operates
through a body of customary law consisting of the practices of states
undertaken out of a sense of legal obligation (the opinio juris).26 Cus-
' This article provides only an outline of the largely unsatisfactory performance of custom-
ary international law in international water management. For more detailed treatment of the
subject see generally WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 3; Dellapenna, supra note 3;
Joseph W. Dellapenna, Symposium: Environmental Rights and International Peace: Surface Water
in the Iberian Penninsula; An Opportunity for Cooperation or a Source of Conflict?, 59 TENN.
L. REV. 803 (1992) [hereinafter Surface Water].
' See generally Detlapenna, supra note 3, at 40-45; Northcutt Ely & Abel Wolman, Admin-
istration, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 124 (Albert Garretson et al. eds.,
1967) (emphasizing the importance of administrative procedures to avoid water shortages);
HISTORY AND LAW, supra note 14, at 113-203.
2 See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 60 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 1963). For
additional background on the operation of customary international law, see generally ANTHONY
D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCI-
PLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-11 (4th ed. 1990); JANIS, supra note 22, at 41-54;
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT 368-93 (1958); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 (1986); G.L TuNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 113-203 (William Butler
trans., 1974); 1 J.H.W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECrIvE 31-47 (1968).
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tomary international law (regional or general) develops through a process
of claim and counterclaim between states.27 Practices that crystallize as
customary international law can include multilateral decisions reflected
in votes in international assemblies," decisions by international courts
or international arbitrators,29 or apparently unilateral actions of states. °
Even treaties or other international agreements can express customary
rules of international law.3' The writings of well-respected international
law scholars, "the most highly qualified publicists" according to the
Statute of the International Court of Justce,32 often contain the best evi-
dence of what such practices are and whether those practices arise from
a sense of legal obligation or from motives unrelated to law.
This brief description of customary international law presents a
picture of a rather primitive legal system without specialized organs for
making and enforcing law or for assuring representation in legal pro-
cesses to the people most directly affected by an international dispute.33
Despite the continuing primitive state of customary international law, it
is not wholly without merit. Customary international law empowers
international actors by legitimating their claims and limits the claims
they are permitted to make. Because of the general absence of a neutral
enforcement mechanism, however, customary international law usually
has nothing better to offer for sanctioning violations than the law of the
vendetta.' As a result, customary international law has proven unable
2 The classic description of this process is found in Myres S. McDougal & Norbert A.
Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.J.
648, 655-61 (1955). See also CHARLES DE VIssHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1968).
28 See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 14-15, 30-31; JANIS, supra note 22, at 50-52;
OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 84-94 (1991); Christopher
C. Joyner, U.N. General Assembly Resolutions and International Law: Rethinking the Contempo-
rary Dynamics of Norm-Creation, 11 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 445, 446-53, 457-59 (1981).
29 BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 19-24; JANIS, supra note 22, at 79-82, 140-42;
LAUTERPACHT, supra note 26; SHABTAI ROSENNE, 2 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT 611-13 (1965); Michael Akehurst, The Hierarchy of the Sources in International
Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 273 (1974).
3 BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 5; JANIS, supra note 22, at 44-50.
3' For examples of treaties as evidence of custom being binding on non-party states, see
BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 11-14; JANIS, supra note 22, at 48-49; MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET
AL., LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 82-83, 115-19 (1963); LORD McNAIR, THE LAW OF
TREATIES 216-18 (1961); JULUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 135 (1954).
But see F.J. BERBER, RIVERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 128-37 (R.K. Batstone trans., 1959);
CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, I INTERNATIONAL LAW 10, 12 (2d ed. 1945).
32 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(d), 59 Stat. 1055 (1945). See
generally BROWNLE, supra note 26, at 24-25; JANIS, supra note 22, at 79-82; LAUTERPACHT,
supra note 26, at 23-25.
3 See HART, supra note 22; JANIS, supra note 22; Dinstein, supra note 22.
34 WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 3, at 161. See also Richard B. Bilder, Some
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by itself to solve the problems that arise in the management of
transboundary water resources. 5
A. The Pattern of Customary Legal Claims Regarding
Internationally-Shared Water Resources
The process of claim and counterclaim, from which the customary
international law of shared water resources emerges, has followed a
rather definite and quite predictable pattern.36 There is one rule to
which all states apparently agree: only riparian states, that is, states
across which, or through which, a river flows have any legal right to
use the water of a river or other surface source, absent the consent by
all affected riparian states.37 Beyond this, however, the patterns of in-
ternational claim and counterclaim diverge sharply according to the
riparian status of the state making the claim.
The uppermost-riparian state initially presents a claim of "absolute
territorial sovereignty,' '38 typically claiming the right to do whatever it
chooses with the water regardless of its effect on other riparian states.
Downstream states, on the other hand, generally begin with a claim to
the "absolute integrity of the river" or other surface water source,39
Limitations of Adjudication as an International Dispute Settlement Technique, 23 VA. J. INT'L L.
1 (1982); Richard A. Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation, 63 AM. J.
INT'L L. 415 (1969).
' See William Van Alstyne, The Justiciability of International River Disputes: A Study in
the Case Method, 1964 DUKE LJ. 307; Surface Water, supra note 24, at 814-22; Dellapenna, su-
pra note 3, at 37-40; Albert E. Utton, International Streams and Lakes Generally, in 5 WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS 1-44 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991). See also Richard A. Falk, International
Jurisdiction: Horizontal and Vertical Conceptions of Legal Order, 32 TEMP. L.Q. 295 (1959).
3 For other illustrative works on transboundary surface water law, see Draft Articles, supra
note 12; BERBER, supra note 31; B. R. CHAUHAN, SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW
DIsPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS (1981); GEORGE KAECKENBEECK, INTERNATIONAL
RIVERS; A MONOGRAPH BASED ON DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1919); LUDWIK A. TECLAFF,
WATER LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECIVE (1985) [hereinafter WATER LAW]; Richard B. Bilder,
International Law and Natural Resources Policies, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 451 (1980); Jan
Hostie, Problems of International Concerning Irrigation of Arid Lands, 31 INT'L AFF. 61 (1955);
Utton, supra note 35.
' Draft Articles, supra note 12, at art. 4; WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 3, at
166-67.
" WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 3, at 164-65. This theory has one of its best
known expressions in a published opinion by former U.S. Attorney-General Harmon. 21 Op.
Att'y Gen. 274, 281-82 (1895). The "Harmon Doctrine" has been disapproved by the U.S. State
Department. See Memorandum to the Legal Advisor, Nov. 23, 1942, in 3 Whiteman DIGEST,
Colorado § 13, at 953.
" WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 3, at 165; A.P. Lester, River Pollution in Inter-
national Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 828, 831-32 (1963).
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claiming that upper-riparian states can do nothing that affects the quanti-
ty or quality of water available to the lower state. The utter incompati-
bility of such claims guarantees that neither claim will prevail in the
end, although the process of negotiating and reaching solutions might
require decades. The usual solution is found in a concept of "restricted
sovereignty."'  Not surprisingly, states wedged along a river, between
other states, as both an upper and lower riparian state, are often first to
embrace a theory of restricted sovereign rights. Under this theory, each
state recognizes the right of all riparian states to use some water from a
common source, and the obligation to manage use so as not to interfere
with the similar use of other riparian states.4 The quantity of water
allocated to each state under this theory is often defined by some select-
ed historic pattern of use. Allocation of water is also occasionally based
upon population, the amount of arable land, or some other objective
measure. Allocation may also be based on a vague notion that each state
is entitled to a "reasonable share" of the water.42 Restricted sovereignty
has become the customary rule of international law as evidenced by
international judicial and arbitral awards,43 the many treaties based on
the concept,44 and the near unanimous opinions of many of the most
highly-qualified scholars.45 Furthermore, every quasi-public and public
40 WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 3, at 165-66.
41 id.
4' Draft Articles, supra note 12, at arts. 5-7.
41 See, e.g., Territorial Jurisdiction of the Int'l Comm'n of the River Oder (U.K., Czech.,
Den., Fr., Ger., Swed. v. Pol.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 23, at 27 (Sept. 10); Lake Lanoux
Case (Fr. v. Spain), 62 REV. G.E. INT'L PUB. 79 (1958), translated in 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 156,
170 (1959); Zarumilla River Arbitration (Ecuador v. Peru), reprinted in Informe del Ministro de
las Relaciones Exteriores a la Naci6n 623 (Quito 1946), translated and cited in William L. Grif-
fin, The Use of Waters of International Drainage Basins Under Customary International Law, 53
AM. J. INT'L L. 50, 61 (1959). See generally Utton, supra note 35, at 14-16 ("[T]he decisions
by international tribunals . . . give significant support to the role of limited territorial sovereign-
ty.").
44 See, e.g., BERBER, supra note 31; REPORT OF THE U.N. COMMISSION FOR EUROPE: LEGAL
ASPECTS OF HYDRO-ELECTRIC DEVELOPMENT OF RIVERS AND LAKES OF COMMON INTEREST, at
95-152, U.N. Doc. EIECE136 (1952); HERBERT ARTHUR SMITH, THE ECONOMIC USES OF
INTERNATIONAL RIVERS (1931); Stephen Schwebel, The Law of Non-Navigational Uses of Inter-
national Watercourses, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 76-82, 88-90, (1982), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/348;
Utton, supra note 35, at 7-14.
4' See generally INT'L L. ASS'N., THE HELSINKI RULES ON THE USES OF THE WATERS OF
INTERNATIONAL RIVERS (Rep. of the 52d Conf., adopted at Helsinki, Aug. 20, 1966) [hereinafter
HELSINKI RULES]; BERBER, supra note 31, at 25, 272-74; D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW
556-58 (2d ed. 1970); OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 474-75 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 8th
ed. 1955); SMITH, supra note 44, at 150-51; WATER LAW supra note 36, at 152; Dominique
Alheritiere, Settlement of Public International Disputes on Shared Resources: Elements of a
Comparative Study of International Instruments, in TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES LAW 139-49
(Albert E. Utton & Ludwik A. Teclaff eds., 1987); Juraj Andrassy, L'utilization des eaux des
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international organization considering the customary legal regime govern-
ing internationally shared water resources has embraced the concept of
restricted sovereignty in one form or another.'
Restricted sovereignty ultimately rests on the concept of an interna-
tional drainage basin as a coherent juridical and managerial unit, a con-
cept widely supported by naturalists, engineers, economists, and ju-
rists.' Given the importance of water to all living organisms, drainage
basins often define ecosystems, which are increasingly becoming the
managerial unit for international environmental planning.48 In short, the
notion of the drainage basin as a fundamental unit, although not the
fundamental unit, of environmental management is essential if the goal
of achieving the "best practicable environmental option" is to have any
chance of success.49
Any legal regime that denies these realities can only foster competi-
tion and eventually conflict. The theory of restricted sovereignty seeks to
bassins fluviaux internationaux, 16 REVUE EGYPTIENNE DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL 23 (1960)
[hereinafter REVUE EGYPTIENNE]; Dante Caponera, Patterns of Cooperation in International Water
Law: Principles and Institutions, in TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES LAW 1, 3-10 (Albert E. Utton
& Ludwik A. Teclaff eds., 1987); Aziza Falmni, International River Law for Non-Navigable
Rivers with Special Reference to the Nile, 23 REVUE EGYFriNNE 39 (1967); Schwebel, supra
note 44, at 82-85, 87-88, 91-103; Utton, supra note 35, at 20-21.
' Draft Articles, supra note 12, at arts. 5-7; INSTITUT DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL, UTILIZA-
TION OF NON-MARITIME INTERNATIONAL WATERS (EXCEPT FOR NAVIGATION), art. 2, 49 INSTITUT
DE DROrr INT'L ANNUAiRE 2, (Sept. 4-13, 1961); INTER-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PRINCI-
PLES OF LAW GOVERNING THE USES OF INrERNATIONAL RIVERS AND LAKES (1958); INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, RULES ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WATER, OTHER NATURAL
RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT, art. I (1980); HELSINKI RULES, supra note 45, at art. IV;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 26, § 601.
47 JOHAN LAMMERS, POLLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 18 (1984). See HISTORY
AND LAW supra note 14; Stephen McCaffrey, International Organizations and the Holistic
Approach to Water Problems, 31 Nat Resources J. 139, 143 (1991); Xue Hanqin, Relativity in
International Water Law, 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENVT'L L. & PoL'Y 45, 46-48 (1992).
'4 See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818
Doc. UNEP/BIO.DIV/N7-INC.5/4 (1992); Convention on Wetlands of International Importance,
especially as Waterfowl Habitat, concluded Feb. 2, 1971, 996 U.N.T.S. 245, 11 I.L.M. 963
(entered into force Dec. 21, 1975); Draft Articles, supra note 12, at arts. 2-23; Rio Declaration
on the Environment and Development, June 3, 1992, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, UNCED Doc.
A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1 (1992); Robert D. Hayton, Observations on the International Law
Commission's Draft Articles on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Articles
1-4, 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 31, 34-40 (1992); Ludwik A. Teclaff & Eileen
Teclaff, International Control of Cross-Media Pollution - An Ecosystem Approach, 27 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 21 (1987).
4 See generally INTEGRATED POLLUTION CONTROL IN EUROPE AND IN NORTH AMERICA
(Nigel Haigh & Frances Irwin eds., 1990); Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrated Pollution Control:
The Way Forward, 7 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 173 (1980); Symposium, Integrated Pollution
Control, 22 ENVTL. L. 1 (1992).
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avoid conflict by allocating available water among the several riparian
states although unfortunately without a universally agreed objective stan-
dard.50
B. The Codification of the Customary International Law of
Internationally-Shared Watercourses
The most recent authoritative expression of the theory of restricted
sovereignty is found in the Draft Articles on the Law of Non-Naviga-
tional Use of International Watercourses prepared by the International
Law Commission.5" The Commission is an organ of the United Nations
designed to promote the "progressive codification of customary interna-
tional law." 2 The Draft Articles embraced both the principle of "equi-
table apportionment" and an obligation to avoid causing appreciable53
harm to other states when submitted to the General Assembly in
1991. 4 The relevant Draft Articles read as follows:
Article 5: Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation.
(1) Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an
international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In
particular, an international watercourse shall be used and developed by
watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal utilization thereof
and benefits therefrom consistent with adequate protection in the water-
course.
(2) Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and
protection of an international watercourse in an equitable and reason-
able manner. Such participation includes both the right to utilize the
watercourse and the duty to cooperate in the protection and develop-
ment thereof, as provided in the present articles.
s See supra note 42 and accompanying test.
5' See Draft Articles, supra note 12.
52 UNITED NATIONS, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW COMMISSION (4th ed. 1988); see also IAN SINCLAIR, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
1 (1987).
' The International Law Commission, at its most recent working session, voted to substitute
the word "significant" for "appreciable," while intending to leave the substance of the rules
unaffected. No citation for this change was available at the time of publication.
' Draft Articles, supra note 12, at arts. 5, 7. The law of international rivers has been on
the Commission's agenda since 1949, although work only began in earnest in 1971. SINCLAIR,
supra note 52, at 27, 40. For a summary history of the Commission's work on international
rivers, see James L. Westcoat, Jr., Beyond the River Basin: The Changing Geography of Interna-
tional Water Problems and International Watercourse Law, 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENVrL. L. & POL'Y
301 (1992).
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Article 7: Obligation not to cause appreciable harm.
Watercourse States shall utilize an international watercourse in such a
way as not to cause appreciable harm to other watercourse States 5
The several Chief Rapporteurs for the project in 1981 and 1982
acknowledged that the rule of "equitable utilization" had virtually unani-
mous recognition as a general rule of international law. Yet, Stephen
McCaffrey, the final Rapporteur, concluded that the International Law
Commission intended the rule of no appreciable harm to prevail over the
rule of equitable sharing.' Perhaps one can reach this conclusion by
comparing the categorical command in article 7 with the more precatory
language of article 5.5 However, McCaffrey's conclusion ignores the
express provisions of the Draft Articles:
Article 10: Relationship between uses.
(1) In the absence of agreement or custom to the contrary, no use of
an international water course enjoys priority over other uses.
(2) In the event of a conflict between uses of an international water
course, it shall be resolved with reference to the principles and factors
set out in articles 5 to 7, with special regard being given to the re-
quirements of vital human needs 9
The asserted absolute primacy of the rule of no appreciable harm
also ignores the reality of water usage. Logically, the no appreciable
harm principle prohibits any meaningful use by an upper-riparian state,
turning the principle into merely a variant form of the absolute integrity
claim. That position, while frequently advocated by lower-riparian states,
has never been adopted by actual international decision-makers ° Fur-
Draft Articles, supra note 12.
Jens Evensen, First Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 155, 170-74 (1983), U.N. Doc. AICN.4/367; Schwebel,
supra note 44, at 85. See also Charles Bourne, Principles and Planned Measures, 3 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 65, 73-77 (1992); McCaffrey, supra note 47, at 150-57.
' Stephen McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses: Some Recent Developments
and Unanswered Questions, 17 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 505, 509-10 (1989). See also Bourne,
supra note 56, at 77-82; GUnther Hand!, The International Law Commission's Draft Articles on
the Law of International Watercourses (General Principles and Planned Measures): Progressive
or Retrogressive Development of International Law?, 3 COLO. . INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 123.
129-33 (1992); Charles Odidi Okidi, "Preservation and Protection" Under the 1991 ILC Draft
Articles on the Law of International Watercourses, 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 143,
147 (1992).
5s Draft Articles, supra note 12.
Draft Articles, supra note 12, at art. 10. Article 6 describes, in highly general terms, the
factors to be considered in determining whether a use is reasonable and an apportionment is
equitable. Id at art 6.
' See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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thermore, as the state seeking to initiate a new use would generally be
cast in terms of the one creating the "injury," absolute integrity favors
more highly developed states at the expense of their less developed
neighbors, particularly as lower basin states tend to develop earlier and
61faster than upper basin states. Such a situation is hardly conducive to
achieving the developmental equity proclaimed under various United
Nations banners.
One can reconcile the two rules by stressing that the no harm rule
actually prohibits only "appreciable harm," "sensible harm," "significant
harm," "substantial harm," or the like.62 These standards require a de-
termination of whether a use of the water source represents a reasonable
or equitable utilization.63 As the German Federal Supreme Court stated
in The Danauversinkung Case (Wiirttemberg v. Baden),' "[o]ne must
consider not only the absolute injury caused to the neighboring State,
but also the relation of the advantage gained by one to the injury caused
to the other."'65 According to this view, the rule of no appreciable harm
is really just a variant statement of the rule of equitable apportionment
or equitable utilization under the principle of restricted sovereignty in
the watersource.'
The need for the orderly and peaceful administration of shared
water resources has encouraged nations to go further than the theory of
restricted sovereignty, toward a model even more restrictive of their
sovereignty. The more restrictive model can fairly be described as a rule
of "community of property" in the watersource.67 Under the community
of property model, a waterbasin is jointly developed and managed as a
61 Bourne, supra note 56, at 92. See Albert Garretson, The Nile Basin, in THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 256, 264-65 (Albert Garretson et al. eds., 1967). See generally
Westcoat, supra note 54, at 319-25.
The exceptions generally occur in situations where a region is colonized by a technological-
ly more developed culture from outside the region. Perhaps the most notable example is the
United States' relationship with Mexico. See, e.g., Alberto Szdkely, "General Principles" and
"Planned Measures" Provisions in the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: A Mexican Point of View, 3 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 93 (1992).
2 Schwebel, supra note 44, at 98-100.
61 Id. at 99-107. See HELSINKI RuLES, supra note 45, at art. X (commentary); INT'L L.
ASS'N, supra note 46, at art. 1; McCaffrey, supra note 47, at 144-46; Utton, supra note 35, at
21-26, 43-44.
4 Ann. Digest & Rep. of Pub. Int'l L. Cases 128 (RGst. 1927). See also Evensen, supra
note 55, at 172-74; Schwebel, supra note 44, at 102.
'3 See also Bourne, supra note 56, at 82-92; Utton, supra note 35, at 26-31.
" See generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
See generally WATER LAW, supra note 36, at ch. X; WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra
note 3, at 171-73.
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unit without regard to international borders and with an agreed sharing
of the benefits of, and equitable participation in, such development and
management. 8 Although full instantiation of this approach is still
rare,69 there are good reasons for believing that the practice of nations
will continue to move more strongly in this direction.
Several international meetings recently adopted the principle of
community of property as the goal in settling disputes over shared water
resources, culminating in the recently completed Draft Articles of the
International Law Commission. ° The central provisions propounding
the community of property model are found in articles 8 and 26 of the
Draft Articles:
Article 8: General Obligation to Cooperate.
Watercourse States shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality,
territorial integrity and mutual benefit in order to obtain optimal utili-
zation and adequate protection of an international watercourse.
Article 26: Management.
(1) Watercourse States shall, at the request of any of them, enter into
consultations concerning the management of an international water-
course, which may include the establishment of a joint management
mechanism.
(2) For the purpose of this article, "management" refers, in particular
to:
(a) planning the sustainable development of an international wa-
tercourse and providing for the implementation of any plans
adopted, and
(b) otherwise promoting rational and optimal utilization, protec-
tion, and control of the watercourse. 71
Article 8 sets out the general duty of cooperative management.'
Article 26 requires good faith cooperation, with joint management as a
genuine (and often necessary) option in that cooperation.73 These arti-
cles contemplate an obligation of active cooperation on the part of ripar-
' L.F.E. Goldie, Equity and the International Management of Transboundary Resources, in
TRANSBOtNDARY RESOURCES LAw 103-37 (Albert E. Utton & Ludwik A. Teclaff eds., 1987);
Utton, supra note 33, at 6.
' See, e.g., Treaty for Anazonian Co-operation, July 3, 1978, art. I, reprinted in 17 LL.M.
1046; Evensen, supra note 56, at 169-74.
" Draft Articles, supra note 12, at arts. 8-19, 26, 27. See generally Utton, supra note 35, at
38-43 (analyzing the Draft Articles).
"' Draft Articles, supra note 12, at arts. 8, 26.
7I Id. at art. 8.
71 Id. at art. 26.
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ian states, rather than a mere partition of the waters. The articles, how-
ever, do not establish how this cooperation is to be realized. Given the
multifarious variations in waterbasins across the globe, a universal treaty
perhaps could do no more to improve the situation.
An obligation of cooperative management cannot be realized simply
through customary law processes. Active and ongoing managerial coop-
eration requires a formal legal framework that can only be created by a
treaty which establishes the duties and responsibilities of all of the par-
ties.
m11. THE EVOLUTION OF TREATY PRACTICE
By 1950, states had entered into nearly 100 treaties based on the
rule of restricted sovereignty for their shared waters and more such
treaties have followed.74 The foregoing general conclusions describe in
abstract terms the transition of treaty practice from the model of restrict-
ed sovereignty (equitable apportionment) to the theory of community of
property (equitable participation). In this section, I summarize actual
treaty practice, beginning with agreements that barely acknowledge the
interest of neighboring states in the shared waters and ending with an
examination of the extensive arrangements of joint development and
management of the resource. Although I arrange treaty practice in the
order of its logical succession, the reader should note that in real time
these agreements did not always follow the evolutionary sequence pro-
vided here. The needs of the time dictated the development and sophisti-
cation of the agreement. Thus, some instances required active joint man-
agement, for example, before the less developed agreements to share
information or allocate water had even been considered.
A. Stopping Short of Allocating Water between the Riparian States
The simplest arrangement recognizing the interrelationship of water
uses in states adjacent to an internationally shared waterbody or lying in
succession along the waterbody is a commitment to share information
about the uses in the several states. Such an agreement, by enabling
water users to consider existing or planned uses elsewhere on the
waterbody, could reduce direct conflicts. A relatively early example is
the Portuguese-Spanish convention of 1866 that required consultations
before either signatory licensed a private hydraulic work on the interna-
tional reaches of transboundary rivers.75
74 See BERBER, supra note 31; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 44, at 95-152; Utton, supra
note 35, at 7-14.
7S Boundary Treaty, Sept. 29, 1864, Spain-Port., Annex Agreement on Regulation of Bound-
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Such agreements have extremely limited utility. Merely sharing
information is only helpful when there is enough water available to
satisfy all, or nearly all, potential users. When water is chronically in
short supply and there is no agreed arrangement for determining which
uses are to be preferred over other uses; agreements providing for the
sharing of information will fail to prevent or resolve conflicts between
users or their governments. Such agreements might even exacerbate
conflict if one of the parties seeks to evade its obligations, thereby
augmenting distrust and its accompanying tension." Information sharing
agreements have thus tended to give way to agreements designed, at the
least, to prevent direct conflicts between competing hydraulic projects.
The first step towards preventing such direct conflicts, and the next
step in developing the notion of restricted sovereignty, is simply to
agree that no hydraulic project can be undertaken in either state without
the consent of the other if the proposed project would sensibly impair
the waterbody, or at least sensibly interfere with the water's uses in the
other state. An early example is the 1905 agreement between Norway
and Sweden regarding their shared watercourses.77 The agreement be-
tween the United States and Canada to create a Joint Boundary Waters
Commission to approve works in either state that would likely affect
persons in the other state carries the process one step further because,
although each state has equal representation on the Commission, the
members are not bound directly by their government's instructions." A
multilateral agreement binding the signatory states "to refrain from all
measures likely to prejudice the navigability" of waterways was signed
ary Waters, Nov. 20, 1866, 129 Consol. T.S. 453, 455 [hereinafter Boundary Waters Agreement].
See also Frontier Treaty, Dec. 12, 1928, Aus.-Czech., art. 28(3), 108 L.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter
Aus.-Czech. Frontier Treaty].
' Perhaps the best example is the continuing charges by Arab states that Israel has not
complied with the ambiguous provisions of Jordan River water consumption agreements. See, e.g.,
GARFINKLE, supra note 15, at 40, 164-69; Douglas Davis, Future Water Shortages Threaten
Middle East Peace, JERUSALEM POST, May 25, 1990 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, JPOST
File; Joff6, supra note 6, at 73; Mahmoud Riyadh, Israel and the Arab Water in Historical Per-
spective, in ISRAEL AND ARAB WATER 10 (Abdel Majid Farid & Hussein Sirdyeh eds., 1985).
Similar difficulties emerged during the period between the partition of the Indus Valley between
India and Pakistan and the subsequent agreement on dividing the waters. See Baxter, supra note
14, at 451-53, 459-60.
' Convention concerant les lacs et cours de l'eau communs, Oct. 26, 1905, Nor.-Swed., 34
MARTENS NOUVEAU RECUan. (2e ser.) 711 [hereinafter Lake Convention]. See also Convention
on Certain Questions Relating to the Law on Watercourses, May 11, 1929, Swed.-Nor., art.
12(1), 120 L.N.T.S. 277, 281 [hereinafter Swedish-Norwegian Convention].
7' Boundary Waters Treaty, Jan. 11, 1909, U.S.-Gr. Brit., arts. III, IV, IX, X, 36 Stat. 2449,
T.S. 548; Treaty for the Co-Operative Development of the Columbia River Basin, Jan. 17, 1961,
U.S.-Can., arts. XIV, XVI, 15 U.S.T. 1555, [hereinafter Columbia Basin Treaty]. See generally
Utton, Canadian International Waters, supra note 9.
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by twenty states in 1921, but ultimately was ratified by only five states
(including the British Empire).79 A similar principle was subsequently
incorporated into a multilateral convention on hydroelectric works affect-
ing more than one state.8"
Agreements not permitting new works without obtaining another
interested state's consent allow easy solutions to conflicting plans when
water is fairly plentiful and both states have the ability to grant one
another consent. Such success is often signalled by a succession of
agreements, each apparently of limited import but cumulatively repre-
senting a high degree of joint development of a basin's water resourc-
es.8" When water is scarce relative to demand, the need to secure con-
sent to every significant change in water use can simply paralyze further
development of the resource. Unless this is the goal sought (as in the
Anglo-Italian agreement on the Atbara),82 such an agreement quickly
ceases to be an acceptable solution and attempts to evade its provisions
will breed suspicion and hostility.
B. Allocating Water Between States
The threat of paralysis to the development of water resources
through agreements requiring mutual consent leads to another type of
arrangement: that is, agreements to divide the transboundary waters by
volume. Such agreements have been made as successors to earlier agree-
ments to inform, consult, or approve hydraulic works on transboundary
waters, often when developing technology made the harnessing of a
common river's hydroelectric potential increasingly attractive. As a re-
sult, agreements allocating transboundary waters by volume or otherwise
' Convention Regulating Navigable Waterways of International Concern, Apr. 20, 1921, art.
10, 7 L.N.T.S. 35 [hereinafter Convention on Navigable Waterways].
' General Convention Relating to the Development of Hydraulic Power Affecting More than
One State, Dec. 9, 1923, art. 4, 36 L.N.T.S. 76,81 [hereinafter Convention on Hydraulic Power].
" For example, such is the situation between Canada and the United States concerning the
Great Lakes-St. Lawrence basin and the Columbia River basin. See WATER LAW, supra note 36,
at 428-29, 438-43, 458-61; Utton, supra note 9. The Rhine is controlled by a similar regime.
WATER LAW, supra note 36, at 450-51 n.28. See also George Radosevich, Implementation: Joint
Institutional Management and Remedies in Domestic Tribunals (Articles 26-28, 30-32), 3 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 261, 263-66 (1992) (describing the evolution of the less successful
Mekong Committee).
' For a description of the early and inadequate agreements limiting Ethiopia's right to
develop the waters of the Atbara and the Blue Nile, see R.K. Batstone, The Utilisation of the
Nile Waters, 8 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 523, 551-55 (1959); Garretson, supra note 61, at 291-92;
Sayed Hosni, The Nile Regime, 17 REvuE EGYPTiENNE DE DROIT INT'L 70, 89-91 (1961); C.O.
Okidi, Review of Treaties on Consumptive Utilization of Waters of Lake Victoria and Nile Drain-
age System, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 161, 192-93 (1982).
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have become quite common as instantiations of the theory of restricted
sovereignty, sometimes coupled with a requirement that any works po-
tentially interfering with the rights of a party to the agreement cannot be
undertaken without the other party's consent.
Agreements to allocate the hydroelectric potential of a waterbody
distribute either the waters available at power sites or the power to be
produced by a single facility or concessionaire. For example, Portugal
and Spain agreed to a convention in 1927 dividing the international
portion of the Duoro River into two parts, with Spain to exploit the
hydroelectric potential of the first part and Portugal the hydroelectric
potential of the second part. 3 This Convention, still in effect, also con-
tains guarantees of minimum flows' and establishes an International
Joint Commission." The Commission serves as a channel to share in-
formation about the development of the hydroelectric potential of the
international reaches of the transboundary rivers, and is also empowered
to decide whether proposed works are compatible with the Convention's
provisions. The Commission's unanimous decisions are immediately
binding on the states, but majority decisions must be approved by the
two governments.86 Approval is presumed if neither government objects
within thirty days of the decision's communication to the governm-
entsY The Duoro Convention also provides for recourse to the Inter-
national Court of Justice should the parties fail to agree. No such
proceeding has ever been brought, however, and the agreement makes
no provision for the implementation of a judicial award.
Some allocation agreements seek to achieve the desired goal by
specifying the amount of water that must be left in the watersource and
not by specifying the amount of water that might be diverted.89 The
' Convention to Regulate the Hydro-Electric Development of the International Section of the
River Duoro, Aug. 11, 1927, Spain-Port., art. 1-2, 82 L.N.T.S. 131, 133 [hereinafter Duoro Con-
vention]. See Surface Water, supra note 24, at 813.
' Duoro Convention, supra note 83, at arts. 8, 18.
85 Id. at art. 14. Portugal and Spain agreed in 1964 to extend the authority of the Interna-
tional Joint Commission over other sorts of hydraulic works and introduced a measure of flexi-
bility in the sharing of the hydroelectric potential of the Duoro River. Surface Water, supra note
24, at 813, The powers of the International Joint Commission to guarantee minimum flows were
extended to the Guadiana River in 1968. Id.
' Duoro Convention, supra note 83, at art. 16.
7 id.
s Id. at art. 21.
See, e.g., Treaty Relating to Uses of the Waters of the Niagara River, Feb. 27, 1950,
U.S.-Can., arts. 4, 6, 1 U.S.T. 694; Convention du Rhone pour l'amenagement de la puissance
hydraulique, Oct. 4, 1913, Fr.-Switz., art. 5, 5 MARTENS NOUVEAU REcUEI. (3e ser.) 291
[hereinafter Rhone Convention]; Convention concernant l'amenagement de la chute du Doubs pres
de Chatelot, Nov. 19, 1930, Fr.-Switz., art. 5, 26 MARTENS NouvEAu RECuEmt (3e ser.) 314
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United States has largely resolved its long-standing disputes with Mexico
by entering a series of agreements obligating the United States to deliver
specific quantities of water to the Mexican border and by creating an
International Joint Commission to construct hydraulic works on the
international reaches of the shared rivers.' In a 1961 agreement, India
and Pakistan used a version of this approach as a means of avoiding
both continuing disputes and joint management by agreeing to divide
their shared waters by source stream, giving each state the exclusive use
of certain tributaries of the Indus River.9' The effect of the Indus Wa-
ters Treaty was to require Pakistan to construct a new canal system to
shift its reliance from the rivers assigned to India to rivers that had
hitherto been less developed. The deal became possible because India
agreed to underwrite the expenses of Pakistan's new canals,' although
the money was actually provided by a development fund administered
by the World Bank.93 The Indus Waters Treaty also imposed an obliga-
tion to exchange information and provided for mutual inspection to
assure compliance, subject to binding arbitration of technical ques-
tions. 4
C. Jointly Managing Internationally-Shared Waters
As the foregoing brief review of agreements partitioning water re-
sources suggests, creative use of such agreements can resolve many
potential controversies over shared waters with a minimum of ongoing
active cooperation. Such agreements ultimately remain unsatisfactory as
the ensuing unilateral activities by the parties to the partition can only
coincidentally optimize the utilization of the resource. As a panel of
experts appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations con-
cluded in 1957:
It is now widely recognized that individual water projects - whether
[hereinafter Doubs Convention].
9' Convention Providing for the Equitable Distribution of the Waters of the Rio Grande for
Irrigation Purposes, May 21, 1906, U.S.-Mex., 34 Stat. 2953; Treaty Respecting Utilization of
Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, U.S.-Mex., 59
Stat. 1219 [hereinafter Water Utilization Treaty]. See also WATER LAW, supra note 36, at 429-
33; Albert E. Utton, Mexican International Waters, in 5 WATERS AND WATER RiGHTS 95
(Robert E. Beck ed., 1991).
"' Indus Waters Treaty, Sept. 19, 1960, India-Pak., art. II, 419 U.N.T.S. 126.
9 Id. at art. IV.
' For a detailed description of the World Bank's role, see Baxter, supra note 14, at 457-78.
See generally HISTORY AND LAWS, supra note 14, at 163-65, 183-84; WATER LAW, supra note
36, at 436-38; Concannon, supra note 14.
' Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 91, at arts. VIll, IX.
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single or multipurpose - cannot as a rule be undertaken with optimum
benefit for the people affected before there is at least the broad out-
lines of a plan for the entire drainage area.95
Allocation agreements often require frequent negotiation of new arrange-
ments in order to attempt at least temporary optimization of use of the
resource. This has proven true in developing the hydroelectric potential
of the Niagara and Columbia Rivers in the United States and Canada,'
and in resolving recurring disputes between the United States and Mexi-
co over the quality of water delivered pursuant the American treaty
obligations.' The process of negotiating supplemental agreements, at
best, consumes time and money; at worst, important projects might
never be undertaken because the cost of reaching agreement is prohibi-
tive.98 The resulting frustrations can fuel controversy rather than calm
it.
IV. THE NILE RIVER REGIME 9
The Nile River has brought life-giving waters through the heart of
the north African desert for millennia, and has been relied on by farm-
ers and others in Egypt and Nubia since time immemorial."0 The Nile
has also been a significant limiting factor because, while it is the lon-
gest river in the world, it has the smallest average discharge at its
mouth among the nine longest rivers of the world.' The Nile is the
quintessential "exotic river," receiving no inflows of tributary water and
negligible rainfall for approximately the last 3,000 kilometers of its
6,825-kilometer length, and it steadily loses water as it cuts across the
' Integrated River Basin Development, U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Aff., U.N. Doc.
E/3066/Rev. 1, at 1 (1958).
96 KRumTLA, supra note 9, at 197; WATER LAW, supra note 36, at 428-29, 438-43; John-
son, supra note 9, at 234-41 (discussing the Columbia River Basin); Symposium, supra note 9;
Utton, supra note 9, at 73-77.
'7 WATER LAW, supra note 36, at 429-33.
Almost any development involving international cooperation could be selected as an
example of increased expense and inordinate delay. The numerous and unrealized proposals to
develop the Yarmuk River is an example of projects never built because of failure to reach
agreement. See GARFINKLE, supra note 15, at 39-40, 164-69, 184-85; WATER IN THE MIDDLE
EAST, supra note 3, at 43-47, 50-53; Leslie Schmida, Israeli Water Projects and Their Repercus-
sions on the Arab-Isreali Conflict, in ISRAEL AND ARAB WATER 25, 27-28 (Abdel Majid Farid
& Hussein Sirriyeh eds., 1985).
1 See generally HISTORY AND LAW, supra note 14, at 105-08, 112-15; WATER LAW, supra
note 36, at 433-36; JOHN WATERBURY, HYDROPOLITICS OF THE NILE VALLEY (1979); Okidi,
supra note 82.
"9o "VATERBURY, supra note 99, at 12-13, 25-32.
. Id. at 21.
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eastern Sahara to the Mediterranean Sea. 1 2
The technology for irrigation and other consumptive uses has long
remained undeveloped, preventing any serious drawdown of the riv-
er. 3 In fact, well into this century, the major form of irrigation in the
Nile Valley remained the annual floods." With the advent in Egypt of
low-level dams ("barrages") in the mid-nineteenth century0 5 and of
modem hydraulic works, most notably the Aswan High Dam,"° in the
twentieth century, attention inevitably turned to protecting the flow of
water on which these facilities depended.
Gaining political control of the upper reaches of the Nile was not
as difficult in the nineteenth century as it would be today. The British,
after gaining effective control of Egypt in 1882, struggled for nearly two
decades to subdue the sparsely populated Sudan, and raced other colo-
nial powers to find and secure control of the Nile's headwaters.l" Al-
though they did not quite succeed with the latter, they did secure the
headwaters in Uganda, and obtained sovereign control over nearly the
whole Nile valley. The British then obtained, by treaty, the agreement of
the Congo Free State, Ethiopia, and Italy (the other states controlling
various sources of the Nile) not to change the flow of the Nile's waters
without British consent.' Thereafter, the British authorities undertook
works to extend irrigation in Sudan while assuring water supplies to
Egypt.1
9
Financial considerations precluded work on the Egyptian portions of
the planned works even after the Sudanese works were finished in 1925;
instead, Egyptian needs were secured by the British administration of the
Sennar Dam in Sudan."0 When the British Governor-General of Sudan
101 Id. at 18-19.
" See, e.g., Ludwik A. Teclaff, Fiat or Custom: The Checkered Development of Interna-
tional Water Law, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 45, 63 (1991).
o WATERBURY, supra note 99, at 19-32.
"' Id. at 32-42. See also Garretson, supra note 61, at 264-67.
i0 WATERBURY, supra note 99, at 87-89, 94-153; Garretson, supra note 61, at 274-76.
107 WATERBURY, supra note 99, at 43-47.
"0 Protocol Delimiting Spheres of Influence in East Africa, Apr. 15, 1891, Gr. Brit.-Italy, art.
3, reprinted in 83 BRrr. & FOR. STATE PAPERS 21; Treaties Relative to the Frontiers Between
the Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, May 15, 1902, U.K.-Eth.-Italy, art. 3, 1902 G.B.T.S. No. 16
(Cmnd. 1370); Agreement Relating to the Boundaries of the Sudan, May 9, 1906, U.K.-Congo,
art. 3, 1906 G.B.T.S. No. 4 (Cmnd. 2920). See Batstone, supra note 82, at 533-37; Garretson,
supra note 61, at 277-78; Hosni, supra note 82, at 71-73; Okidi, supra note 82, at 167-70.
109 Nile Commission, 1925 Report, § 10-13, in 21 MARTENS NOUVEAU RECUEIL (3e ser.)
101; WATER LAW, supra note 36, at 433-34; Garretson, supra note 61, at 267-70, 278-84;
Hosni, supra note 82, at 73-80.
"0 SMITH, supra note 44, at 77; WATER LAW, supra note 36, at 434; Garretson, supra note
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was murdered in Cairo in 1924 during nationalist unrest, motivated in
part by a demand for the incorporation of Sudan into Egypt, the British
reacted in part by threatening to permit unlimited Sudanese irrigation.
Eventually, the British and Egyptian governments reached an agreement
in 1929 assuring continued British control of Sudan predicated on
Sudan's subordination to Egypt's dominant position on the Nile."'
As soon as Sudanese independence was assured in 1953,"1 the
Sudanese government demanded modification of the 1929 agreement as
too restrictive of Sudanese development."' Sudan particularly objected
to the planned Aswan High Dam, as it would flood parts of Sudan and
also require Egyptian approval before new works could be constructed
in Sudan."4 A new treaty ratified in 1959 settled most outstanding
questions between the two countries."'
The 1959 Treaty included reciprocal consent to new dams in each
country: the High Dam at Aswan in Egypt and a new dam on the Blue
Nile in Sudan." '6 More importantly, the Treaty allocated the flow of
the Nile between the two states: 48 billion cubic meters (BCM) to
Egypt and 4 BCM to Sudan, both measured at Aswan." 7 "Surplus"
water from the Sudd, a large swamp in the south of Sudan, was allo-
cated more favorably to Sudan: up 14.5 BCM to Sudan and only 7.5
BCM to Egypt."' The Treaty further committed Sudan to undertake
additional reclamation works in upper Sudan, with the water reclaimed
to be allocated equally to the two nations." 9 Finally, the two nations,
which termed the Treaty as one for "the Full Utilization of the Nile
Waters," sought to present a united front to other Nile basin states
through the following remarkable clause:
[B]oth republics agree to study together [the claims of other Nile basin
61, at 282-83; Hosni, supra note 82, at 79.
,II SMrrH, supra note 44, at 70-71; WATERBURY, supra note 99, at 63-67; Batstone, supra
note 82, at 523-33; Garretson, supra note 61, at 284-86; Hosni, supra note 81, at 80-87; Okidi,
supra note 82, at 170-76.
"' Agreement Concerning Self-Government and Self-Determination for the Sudan, Feb. 12,
1953, Egypt-Gr. Brit., 161 U.N.T.S. 157. See generally WATERBURY, supra note 99, at 48-55.
113 WATERBURY, supra note 99, at 67-77.
"' Batstone, supra note 82, at 540, 547-50; Garretson, supra note 61, at 286-92; Hosni,
supra note 82, at 91-99; Okidi, supra note 82, at 181-85.
1.. Agreement on the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, Nov. 8, 1959, U.A.E.-Sudan, 453
U.N.T.S. 51, reprinted in 15 REVUE EGYrIENNE 321 (1959) [hereinafter Nile Treaty].
116 Id. at art. 2.
"1 Id. at art. 1.
RI ld. at art. 2.
" Id. at art. 3.
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states] and adopt a unified view thereon. If such studies result in the
possibility of allotting an amount of water to one or the other of these
territories, then the value of this amount as Aswan shall be reduced in
equal shares from the share of each of the two Republics." °
The Treaty solved the problems of the two countries, although the Suda-
nese have complained about "shortages in the midst of plenty." '' Con-
tinuing population growth has made the problems of inadequate water
supplies a pressing one even in Egypt,"2 something unimagined when
the 1959 Treaty was signed. The hydrogeology of the Nile Valley is
such that activities in Burundi, the Central African Republic, Kenya,
Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire, the uppermost states on the
White Nile, are unlikely to affect Egypt or Sudan north of the Sudd.
The Blue Nile presents a rather different picture. The Blue Nile,
arising in the highlands of Ethiopia, contributes the major, but highly
variable, flow of the Nile in northern Sudan and Egypt: between seven-
ty-five and ninety per cent of the flow that reaches Egypt comes from
Ethiopia. 4 Indeed, a good deal of the White Nile's flow in so far as
it reaches the northern Sudan and Egypt, also arises in Ethiopia."a
Continuing political turmoil in Ethiopia has prevented it from developing
the Nile's waters before those waters leave the country. If the present or
a successor regime succeeds in stabilizing the country and undertaking
major development projects, however, this picture will change. 6 Egypt
1 Id. at art. 5. Since then, the two states have taken further steps to integrate their econo-
mies and have made occasional gestures towards integrating their governments.
12 See generally WATERBURY, supra note 99, at 174-210, 231-41; Abdin M.A. Salih, The
Nile Inside the Sudan - Increasing Demands and Their Consequences, 10 WATER INT'L 73
(1985); Bret Wallach, Irrigation in Sudan Since Independence, 78 GEOGRAPHICAL REv. 417
(1988).
", See WATERBURY, supra note 99, at 118-19, 151-53, 213-31; The Nile; A Grasping Ser-
pent, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1988, at 74.
1 WATERBURY, supra note 99, at 14-17, 23-24; Okidi, supra note 82, at 164-65, 189-98.
Even when projects are designed that might produce significant water from the Sudd, the contin-
uing civil disorder in Southern Sudan prevents their implementation. Kathryn Davies, Egypt,
Sudan in Nile Talks, THE GUARDIAN (London), May 31, 1985, at 7; Okidi, supra note 82, at
191-92. These realities have not prevented Egypt from attempting to control what development
occurs in the uppermost states on the White Nile. Garretson, supra note 61, at 286; Hosni,
supra note 82, at 87-89; Okidi, supra note 82, at 176-81, 185-89.
124 WATERBURY, supra note 99, at 17-19; Gamal Moursi Badr, The Nile Waters Question:
Background and Recent Developments, 15 REvUE EGYPrIENNE 94, 95 (1959); Garretson, supra
note 61, at 259; Okidi, supra note 82, at 164.
'25 Garretson, supra note 61, at 259-60, 264.
1" See, e.g., Assem Abdul Mohsen, Egypt, Ethiopia Clash over the Nile, THE MIDDLE EAST,
Sept. 1980, at 70. For a description of the early and inadequate agreements limiting Ethiopia's
right to develop the waters of the Atbara and the Blue Nile, see Batstone, supra note 82, at
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and Sudan, on the other hand, will insist that Ethiopia undertake no
works that inflict "appreciable harm" on their existing activities, basing
their claims on the customary international law as expressed in the Draft
Articles published by the International Law Commission."
The impending struggles over the waters of the Nile follow the
patterns that have been found in river basins worldwide. As is generally
the case, development in the Nile basin occurred earlier and faster in the
lower basin than in the upper-basin." This creates a set of existing
users who demand protection for their "prior rights" and a class of
disadvantaged potential users upstream who demand developmental equi-
ty. Developmental disparities frequently establish a pattern whereby
lower-basin water users have military power to enforce their will, while
the upper-basin users have the water and the ability to cut it off or
contaminate it. The resulting tension can be managed only if the water
is controlled in such a way as to assure the equitable participation of all
states sharing the basin.'29 As R.K. Batstone and others foresaw as ear-
ly as 1959, the very year the treaty was signed, only by reworking the
Nile regime into a coordinated regional management authority can the
basin's problems possibly be solved. 30
V. IMPLEMENTING COMMUNAL (JOINT) MANAGEMENT
Comprehensive management is necessary to optimize water
use-particularly in ard climates like the Middle East and North Africa.
Comprehensive management of an internationally divided water basin,
like in the Jordan Valley, requires joint or communal management.
Perhaps more importantly, it also creates an opportunity for political
benefits to be achieved through cooperation rather than conflict.'
Long-term solutions for the needs of the people in the Jordan Valley
will require a regional mechanism to avert debilitating competition.'32
If the importation of water from outside the Jordan Valley becomes
necessary,' the need for the optimum use of imported water, together
551-55; Garretson, supra note 61 at 291-92; Hosni, supra note 82, at 89-91; Okidi, supra note
82, at 192-93.
' Draft Articles, supra note 12, at art. 7.
The occasional exceptions result from the colonization of the upper basin by a technologi-
cally more developed culture from outside the region, while the lower basin remains in the
possession of the earlier culture. Perhaps the most notable example is the United States' actions
on the Colorado River and the Rio Grande relative to Mexico. See, e.g., Szdkely, supra note 61.
' See generally Utton, supra note 35, at 38-43.
' Batstone, supra note 82, at 555-58. See also Okidi, supra note 82, at 184-89, 198-99.
131 See GARFINKLE, supra note 15; Dellapenna, supra note 3.
1' The truth of this is illustrated by the importance accorded water in the ongoing peace
talks. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
" Several such proposals have been seriously entertained in recent years. See, e.g., JOYCE R.
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with locally available water, will underscore the necessity of regional
cooperation. The states of the Nile basin, or at least Egypt, Ethiopia,
and Sudan, will soon face similar situations.
The essential elements of such a communal management arrange-
ment are easy to describe in general terms, but remain difficult to nego-
tiate or implement in detail. The basic terms of such an agreement
would be based on recognizing that the basin states form a community
united by their common property in shared water resources (hence the
term "community of property"). This concept is realized by:
a. developing and managing the water basin as a unit without regard to
international borders, ideally through a joint transnational institutional
structure;
b. sharing the benefits of that development and management according
to an agreed formula or procedure; and
c. establishing a procedure for constructive investigation and peaceful
resolution of disputes.
Such principles have long been recognized by the United Nations,
beginning even before the Committee of Experts called for communal
management of water basins in 1957. The United Nations continues to
promote communal management at virtually every opportunity."3 Per-
haps the most succinct and emphatic statement of this policy was the
opening statement in a working paper prepared by the U.N. Secretariat
for the Fourth Regional Technical Conference on Water Resources De-
velopment in Asia and the Far East held in Colombo, Ceylon, in 1960:
"River basin development projects are now necessarily multipurpose and
lead to unified development."' 35 The final report of the U.N. Water
Conference at Mar del Plata in 1977 also endorsed this approach: "It is
necessary for States to cooperate in the case of shared water resources
in recognition of the growing economic, environmental and physical
interdependencies across international frontiers. Such cooperation...
must be exercised on the basis of the equality, sovereignty and territorial
integrity of all States."'3 6 The concept that internationally-shared waters
create a community of states sharing property in the water was also ex-
STARR & DANIEL C. STOLL, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY ON WATER RESOURCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
(1987); Joyce Starr, Water Wars, 82 FOR. POL'Y 17 (1991).
" See Integrated River Basin Development, supra note 95. For earlier expressions of support
for integrated management within the United Nations, dating back to 1949, see WATER LAW,
supra note 36, at 427-28.
3' Organization for Planning, Construction and Operation of River Valley Projects, Economic
Commission for Asia and the Far East, U.N. Doc. St./ECAFE/Ser.F/19, at 61 (1962).
" Report of the United Nations Water Conference, Mar del Plata, Argentina, General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.70/29 (1977), at 53.
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pressly endorsed in the Draft Articles on Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses prepared by the International Law Commis-
sion and presented to the General Assembly in 1991.137
Occasional arbitrations and mediations have also supported the
communal approach. One of the best expressions was in a report of the
Rao Commission appointed to resolve the dispute between Sind and
Punjab before the partition of India. The report stated:
The most satisfactory settlement of disputes of this kind is by agree-
ment, the parties adopting the same technical solution of each problem,
as if they were a single unified community undivided by political or
administrative frontiers .... If there is no . .. agreement, the rights
of the several Provinces and States must be determined by applying
the rule of "equitable apportionment," each unit getting a fair share of
the water of the common river.38
As the Rao Commission suggested, the problem with relying on the
community of property concept, that is, a right to equitable participation
in the transnational management of a common resource, is that interna-
tional law does not provide a ready-made blueprint for the necessary
institutional structures. 39 The customary legal obligation can only be
expressed as an obligation to negotiate in good faith for the creation of
the necessary institutions. This obligation is expressed in some detail in
the International Law Commission's Draft Articles,"14 but it remains an
imperfect obligation as there is no procedure to compel the parties to
succeed in the negotiations. The Rao Commission indicated that absent
such success, the best that can be done is to "partition" the water.
Full development of the community of property approach remains
rare because nations are seldom willing to compromise their sovereignty
over a basic resource to the extent necessary to optimize integrated
water management within a basin. Nations have found it easiest to cre-
ate institutions for gathering and sharing data, and it is not much more
" Draft Articles, supra note 12, at arts. 8, 26; see supra text accompanying note 67. See
also Draft Articles, supra note 12, at arts. 20-24 (discussing states' obligations to protect and
preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses through collective and separate action). See
generally Ved P. Nanda, The Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Draft
Articles on Protection and Preservation of Ecosystems, Harmfd Conditions and Emergency
Situations, and Protection of Water Installations, 3 CoLo. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 175
(1992).
38 Indus River Basin Case (Sind v. Punjab), Report of the Indus (Rao) Commission 10-11
(1942).
139 Recognition of this problem pre-dates the Rao Commission. See BERBER, supra note 31,
at 256-74.
"4 Draft Articles, supra note 12, at arts. 9, 11-18, 21, 23, 26-28.
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difficult to create institutions empowered to forbid or restrain alteration
of a watercourse. The latter is particularly true when the purpose of the
institution (e.g., promoting navigation) is best served by preserving the
watercourse more or less intact. Nations have, however, found it very
difficult to agree to relinquish their sovereignty to international institu-
tions authorized to plan, construct, or operate single or multi-purpose
projects despite the considerable benefits to be expected from such insti-
tutions.
The goal of communal management unfortunately therefore remains
largely unrealized. International organizations, such as the United Na-
tions and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(the World Bank), bear considerable responsibility for this failure. De-
spite their consistent abstract support for communal management, they
have done little to promote integrated management by communities of
states sharing a particular basin. The World Bank rightly claims consid-
erable credit for the Indus Waters Treaty, 4' yet it has since taken a
hands-off approach to integrated water management by declining to fund
water projects until every state riparian to the watercourse has approved
the project. This policy plays directly into the hands of the more highly
developed lower-basin states,1 42 requiring the absolute integrity of the
waterbody, and denying every riparian state, except the lowest, the right
to develop water resources within their borders. 4 1 Yet, for international
organizations to ignore the lower-basin interests, in a rush to develop
water resources in upper-basin states, would also not be equitable or
satisfactory. International organizations must begin to provide material
incentives to communal management arrangements instead of sacrificing
the interests of some riparian states to the interests of other riparian
states.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ideal management of water requires a formal legal order in place of
the present informal or customary legal order. To be effective in manag-
ing water and precluding conflict, the institutional structure and formal
legal order would not only have to embody concepts of cooperative
management, but it would have to be able:
141 The World Bank was instrumental in negotiating the Indus Waters Treaty and in arranging
and managing an international fund that discharges India's apparent obligation under the Treaty
to fund new dams and other works for the benefit of Pakistan. See supra note 93.
'4 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
143 Water in the Middle East, supra note 3, at 165; Surface Water, supra note 24, at 815,
820; Lester, supra note 39, at 836-38.
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(1) determine the facts of water use in each nation;
(2) resolve disputes across international boundaries;
(3) guide responses to unusual temporary water shortfalls;
(4) regulate or to design and implement long-term answers to the seri-
ous permanent shortages that exist in the region; and
(5) enforce its decisions."
International practice does provide numerous examples to use as models
for institutional design despite the rarity of full realization of the com-
munity of property arrangement. " Perhaps the earliest example was a
joint commission established to determine the optimum sites for building
locks to enhance navigation on the Meuse, which was created by the
Treaty of Fontainebleau and located between the Holy Roman Empire
and the Netherlands."4 In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, more
elaborate arrangements were created, often creating a permanent commis-
sion to inspect or restrain activities that could impair navigability. 47
Similar single-purpose commissions, temporary or permanent, began to
be created early in the twentieth century in an effort to coordinate the
development of the hydroelectric potential of internationally shared wa-
ters, although many of these did not have final decision-making authori-
ty.148
I" See, e.g., U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, NATURAL RESOURCES WATER
SERiEs No. 1, MANAGEMENT OF INT'L WATER RESOURCES: INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL AspEcTs,
REPORT OF THE PANEL OF EXPERTS ON THE LEGAL AND INSTrrUTIONAL ASPECTS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, U.N. Doc. St/ESA/5, U.N. Sales No. E.75.II.A.2
(1975); Dellapenna, supra note 3, at 40-45; David Le Marquand, Politics of International River
Basin Cooperation and Management, in WATER IN A DEVELOPING WORLD 147 (Albert E. Utton
& Ludwik A. Teclaff eds., 1978); Rodgers & Utton, supra note 11; Albert E. Utton, Interna-
tional Groundwater Management: the Case of the U.S.-Mexican Frontier, in INTERNATIONAL
GROUNDWATER LAW 157-88 (Ludwik A. Teclaff & Albert E. Utton eds., 1981).
145 See, e.g., WATER LAW supra note 36, at 443-48; Evensen, supra note 56.
"4 Trait6 d'Accord Definitif entre S.M. Imperiale et Royale Apostolique et L.H.P. Les
Seigneurs ttats Generaux des Provinces Unies, Nov. 8, 1785, Holy Roman Empire-Neth., art. 6,
4 MARTENS NOUVEAU RECUEIL (2e ed.) 56.
" See, e.g., Congress of Vienna, Final Act, June 9, 1815, arts. 108, 109, 2 MARTENS
NOUVEAU RECUEaL (2e ed.) 427; Trait6 de limites entre leur majestes le roi de Prusse et le roi
des Pays Bas, Oct. 7, 1816, art. 29, 3 MARTENS NOUVEAU RECUEiL (2e ed.) 54; Peace Treaty
Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, June 28, 1919, art. 331, 13 U.S. FOR.
REL. 655-56; Convention on Navigable Waterways, supra note 79; Convention Instituting the
Definitive Statute of the Danube, arts. 3-38, July 23, 1921, 26 L.N.T.S. 175; Convention Insti-
tuting the Statute of Navigation of the Elbe, art. II, Feb. 22, 1922, 26 L.N.T.S. 221; Convention
Regarding Navigation of the Danube, opened for signature Aug. 18, 1948, art. 5-19, 33 U.N.T.S.
197, 199-205.
" See, e.g., Boundary Waters Agreement, supra note 75; Aus.-Czech. Frontier Treaty, supra
note 75, at art. 30-31; Lake Convention, supra note 77; Doubs Convention, supra note 89;
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There are only a few actual examples of multipurpose commissions
with effective power. More commonly, as on the Nile or the Indus, the
commissions are given authority only to gather and disseminate informa-
tion. 49 One of the chief examples of an international commission en-
dowed with real decision-making authority is the International Boundary
Waters Commission created by the United States and Canada. 5° The
Commission has the power to issue binding orders regulating the diver-
sion or obstruction that affect boundary waters.' However, even with
this power, the two nations have felt compelled to undertake consider-
able and further negotiations to resolve many contentious issues.' In
fact, as Ludwik Teclaff has concluded, the Commission has shown little
evidence of "a basin approach in issuing permits for construction in
boundary waters."'53 On the other hand, the International Joint Com-
mission established between the United States and Mexico was given
operative rather than regulatory responsibilities, and is charged with
planning, constructing, and operating dams and other works on the in-
ternational reaches of the boundary waters."'
In many parts of the world, water has been a central political factor
since ancient times."' Water continues to be central today. Whether
such a structure as I have outlined can be negotiated over such a vital
resource, particularly between actors with deeply entrenched distrust and
hostility, might seem unlikely, yet the alternatives seem less tolerable.
The very importance of water makes cooperation over water more likely
than conflict. 6 As in ancient times, the shared need for optimum
management of scarce water can become a source of regional unity
rather than of regional discord.'57 Water can thus become the key to
building peace within a region, if the interested states are prepared to
exploit this possibility actively and effectively, rather than to allow
themselves to drift into mutually destructive competition.
Rhone Convention, supra note 89; Convention on Hydraulic Power, supra note 80; Swedish-
Norwegian Convention, supra note 77; Duoro Convention, supra note 83.
"' Nile Treaty, supra note 115, at art. 4; Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 91, at arts. VIII,
IX.
150 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 75.
Id. at arts. III, IV.
152 See, e.g., Columbia Basin Treaty, supra note 78. See generally WATER LAW, supra note
36, at 428-29, 438-43, 458-61; Utton, supra note 9, at 65.
153 WATER LAW, supra note 36, at 447.
" Water Utilization Treaty, supra note 90, at art. 2.
15 See HISTORY AND LAW, supra note 15, at 28-32, 42-74.
" See supra notes 1-19 and accompanying text.
17 See, e.g., KARL WITTFOGEL, ORIENTAL DESPOTISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TOTAL
POWER (1957).
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